In 2014, Truong et al. proposed modified dynamic ID-based user authentication scheme resisting smart-card-theft attack. He et al. claimed that their proposed scheme could withstand various cryptographical attacks. However, this paper points out that Truong et al.'s scheme is still cannot provide perfect forward secrecy and anonymity of a user unlike its claims. For this reason, Truong et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application.
Introduction
An authentication scheme with smart card is that the most commonly used authentication method that legal users can easily access the resources provided by remote servers. Due to its simplicity and convenience, smart card based authentication scheme is used in many applications such as E-banks or remote host login. In recent years, several dynamic ID-based remote user authentication schemes have been proposed [1, 2, 3, 4] .
In 2004, Das et al. [1] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Das et al.'s scheme has various advantages. In 2012, Lee [2] , however, proposed a new dynamic ID-based user authentication scheme to resist smart-card-theft attack to enhance the security problems of Das et al.'s scheme.
In 2014, Truong et al. [4] proved that Lee's scheme cannot suffer from smart-card-theft attack and masquerading attack. They also pointed out that Lee's scheme cannot provide mutual authentication and session-key exchange phase. Truong et al. proposed an improved version of Lee's scheme in order to recover all problem mentioned. This paper researches Truong et al.'s dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme and shows that their scheme cannot provide perfect forward secrecy and anonymity of a user, that is the user can be traced out to do infringement of user privacy though eavesdropping the user's login request message in the public networks [3] . For this reason, Truong et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review Truong et al.'s scheme in Section 2. The security flaws of Truong et al.'s scheme are presented in Section 3. Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 4.
Review of Truong et al.'s Scheme
Truong et al.'s [4] scheme is divided into the four phases of registration, login, mutual authentication and password change phases. Some important notations in Truong et al.'s scheme are listed as follow:
• U i : A qualified user.
• ID i : Unique identity of U i .
• P W i : Unique password of U i .
• N : The nonce chosen by user in registration phase.
• S: The remote server that users log in.
• x: The secret key of the remote server.
• e: The nonce chosen by server in registration phase.
• h(·): A cryptographic one-way hash function.
• R U : The nonce chosen by user.
• R S : The nonce chosen by server.
• CID i : user's dynamic identity.
• SK: session-key of user and server.
• SC: the smart card.
• ⊕: The exclusive-or operation.
• k: The concatenation operation.
• A ⇒ B: M : A sends M to B via a secure channel.
• A → B: M : A sends M to B via a public channel.
Registration phase
When U i wants to register to S, he/she has to submit his/her ID i , h(P W i ||N ). After receiving {ID i , h(P W i ||N )} from user via a secure channel, S performs the following steps.
1. Generating a random value e.
Computing
A
4. S sends SC containing {A i , L i , e, h(·)} to U i via a secure channel.
5. U i receives SC and inputs N into SC.
Login phase
U i inserts SC into card-reader and ID i and P W i to login to S, and then the SC performs the following steps:
and checking if L i is equal to h(ID i ||h(P W i ||N )||h(x||e)). If this condition holds, SC continues to go next step; otherwise, it terminates the session.
2. Generating R U and computing
and
4. Finally, U i sends {CID i , B i , C i , e} to S.
Mutual authentication and session key agreement phase
S receives the login request message {CID i , B i , C i , e} from U i in the login phase and performs some following steps.
Computing
2. Extracting
Then, S checks ID i 's validity. If this is a valid identity, S continues going to next step. Otherwise, S rejects the login message.
3. S checks whether C i is equal to h(ID i ||R * U ||h(x||e)). If this condition is true, S goes to next step. Otherwise, S terminates the session.
Generating R S and computing
5. Sending {K, V } to U i via a common channel.
6. After receiving {K, V } from S, U i computes
7. U i checks whether V is equal to h(R * S ||h(x||e)). If this condition holds, U i authenticates S successfully. Otherwise, U i terminates the session.
U i computes
and sends M to S via a common channel.
9. S checks whether M is equal to h(R * U ||R S ). If this condition is true, S authenticates U i successfully. Otherwise, S terminates the session.
After authenticating successfully, S computes shared
and U i computes shared
Password update phase
When U i wants to change P W i . He/she can perform following steps:
1. Insert SC into card-reader, inputs ID i , P W i and choose a new password P W new i .
SC computes h(x||e)
3. SC checks whether L i is equal to L * i . If this condition is false, SC terminates this phase. Otherwise, it goes to next step.
SC computes
and 
Cryptanalysis of Truong et al.'s Scheme
This section demonstrates that Truong et al.'s scheme [4] is still vulnerable to impersonation attack unlike their claims.
Infringement of user privacy and anonymity
Truong et al. claimed that their scheme provides the property of the user's anonymity. However, we found that the user's anonymity of Truong et al.'s scheme cannot be protected from an eavesdropping attack in the login phase. That is, the attacker can eavesdrop the user U i 's login request message {CID i , B i , C i , e} between the user U i and the server S from the public channel; e in the login request message {CID i , B i , C i , e} is kept the same in every login session. In other words, a malicious attacker is capable of tracing out the user U i according to e which is in the U i 's login request message. For example, an attacker can perform the following attack to break user privacy and anonymity.
1. Attacker obtains ID i ⊕ h(x||e) by computing CID i ⊕ B i . We can see that
2. In any session, the attacker intercepts user's login request message {CID i , B i , C i , e } and then computes CID i ⊕ B i .
3. Attacker checks whether both ID i ⊕h(x||e) and e are equal to CID i ⊕B i and e . If these conditions are true, it means that
So, the attacker can know this login request message {CID i , B i , C i , e } is sent from the same user U i .
Therefore, Truong et al.'s scheme fails in providing the privacy and anonymity of U i during the login phase.
Perfect forward secrecy problem
Perfect forward secrecy means that if the compromise of the long-term private keys related to participating entities does not affect the security of previous session keys. In Truong et al.'s scheme, when the private key x of the server S is compromised and an adversary has intercepted U i 's previous login request messages {CID i , B i , C i , e} and the server's response message {K, V } over public networks, then the adversary can compute
Then all the past session keys SK = h(R U ||h(x||e)||R S ) of Truong et al.'s scheme should be compromised to the adversary because he/she knows R U , h(x||e), and R S from equations (21)∼(24). From the above discussion, we can conclude that Truong et al.'s scheme fails to protect forward security.
Conclusions
This paper discussed several weaknesses in Truong et al.'s dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme, such as failing to provide anonymity of a user and perfect forward security. For this reason, Truong et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application. Further works will be focused on improving the Truong et al.'s scheme which can be able to provide greater security and to be more efficient than the existing authentication schemes by an accurate performance analysis.
